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Abstract
Background: Commissioning is a term used in the English National Health Service (NHS) to refer to what most
health systems call health planning or strategic purchasing. Drawing on research from a recent in-depth mixed
methods study of a major integrated care initiative in North West London, we examine the role of commissioning
in attempts to secure large-scale change within and between health and social care services to support the delivery
of integrated care for people living with complex long-term conditions.
Methods: We analysed data collected in semi-structured interviews, surveys, workshops and non-participant
observations using a thematic framework derived both deductively from the literature on commissioning and
integrated care, as well as inductively from our coding and analysis of interview data.
Results: Our findings indicate that commissioning has significant limitations in enabling large-scale change in
health services, particularly in engaging providers, supporting implementation, and attending to both its
transactional and relational dimensions.
Conclusions: Our study highlights the consequences of giving insufficient attention to implementation, and
especially the need for commissioners to enable, support and performance manage the delivery of procured
services, while working closely with providers at all times. We propose a revised version of Øvretveit’s cycle of
commissioning that gives greater emphasis to embedding effective implementation processes within models of
commissioning large-scale change.
Keywords: National Health Service, Purchasing, Planning, Commissioning, Coordinated care, Integrated care, Health
and social care integration, Large-scale change, Commissioning cycle
Background
‘Commissioning’ is a term used in the English National
Health Service (NHS) to refer to what most health sys-
tems call health planning or strategic purchasing. The
NHS’ use of commissioning as distinct from contracting
or purchasing has its roots in Øvretveit’s [1, 2] work on
promoting health gain. His framework includes a
strategic intent to improve health through needs assess-
ment, planning, contracting, monitoring and review (see
Fig. 1). Effective commissioning is regarded by NHS pol-
icy makers as crucial to achieving care that is responsive
to patients’ needs and ensures value for money [3].
The need to join up commissioning across whole sys-
tems of health and social care services has been a par-
ticular feature of the debate about the contribution of
commissioning to integration. In principle, it can pro-
vide a framework, first, for aligning strategic planning
and investment decisions across NHS organisations and
© The Author(s). 2019 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
* Correspondence: j.a.smith.20@bham.ac.uk
1Health Services Management Centre, University of Birmingham, Park House,
40 Edgbaston Park Road, Birmingham B15 2RT, UK
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
Smith et al. BMC Health Services Research          (2019) 19:228 
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12913-019-4013-5
with local authorities to secure a balance and mix of ser-
vices, consistent with local needs, resources and desired
outcomes. Second, such frameworks can also be used to
specify improved operational practices including the
timely integration of different service components
around the needs of individuals, service users and their
families. From the perspective of integration, NHS and
joint commissioning have a potentially substantial role
in securing major changes to investment and working
practices within health service and other organisations,
as well as at the boundaries between them.
This paper aims to examine the use and potential of
commissioning as a tool for large-scale change to plan
and implement better integrated health and care ser-
vices. To do so, we review evidence from an in-depth
mixed methods study of NWL using a thematic frame-
work derived both deductively from a review of litera-
ture on commissioning and inductively from our coding
and analysis of interview data.
Given the degree of strategic and operational change
implied by the scale of NWL’s goals for integration, we
also sought to locate the commissioning literature within
the evidence on large-scale change in health systems. In
particular, we adopted the lens provided by Best et al.’s
as a further framework for analysing our empirical find-
ings [4]. These analyses lead to a revised version of
Øvretveit’s cycle of commissioning that gives greater em-
phasis to the development of effective implementation
within commissioning processes and to a confirmation
of Best et al.’s own acknowledgement that their frame-
work requires continuing development.
Evidence on the effectiveness of commissioning in
enabling change in health and social care
Commissioning in the English NHS
Commissioning evolved in the English NHS as an essen-
tial element in the adoption of market-style mechanisms
in 1991 following the NHS and Community Care Act
1990 [5]. It is an approach rooted in the separation of
‘purchaser’ and ‘provider’ roles, supported by formal
contractual mechanisms to regulate relationships be-
tween them. This ‘purchaser-provider split’ was, itself, an
expression of the wider approach known as ‘new public
management’ [6, 7] which sought to introduce competitive
forces into the public sector. The underpinning belief of se-
nior NHS policy makers was that purchasing was ‘the engine
that would drive the reforms’ through improvements to
quality, efficiency and responsiveness [8]. Some 3 years after
initial implementation of the purchaser-provider split in the
NHS in England in 1991, policy makers expanded the con-
cept and function of ‘purchasing’ and started to adopt the
broader role of ‘commissioning’, drawing on the work of
Øvretveit [1, 2].
Commissioning encapsulates a series of linked activities
described in academic literature as an ongoing cycle [2].
This concept has continued to be used in England to rep-
resent commissioning as encompassing the core functions
set out in Fig. 1 [9].
Whilst the cycle implies a series of sequential activities,
the reality is more complicated, with multiple tasks taking
place concurrently and with significant degrees of overlap.
Bovaird et al. [10], in a review of models of public sector
commissioning, noted the tendency for most approaches
to focus on demand-side activities like planning, market
shaping and procurement, with limited reference to sup-
porting service delivery and change. Research into NHS
health commissioning revealed it to be resource-intensive
and ‘laborious’ [11, 12] with inadequate evidence about its
respective costs and outcomes [11, 13].
A related critique of health commissioning in the
English NHS highlighted its ‘highly relational’ char-
acteristics [14] (such as co-design and stakeholder
engagement) and tendency to pay insufficient atten-
tion to transactional functions such as procurement,
contract review, decommissioning and service re-
design [15]. Others have sought to explain the rela-
tive weakness of NHS commissioning by its lack of
institutional ‘fit’ with health professional and
Fig. 1 The commissioning cycle (Department of Health, 2003, after Øvretveit, 1995)
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organisational cultures that prioritise collaboration
and limit its effectiveness [16, 17].
The English NHS emphasises general practitioner
(GP) involvement in commissioning to utilise their
knowledge of individual patients’ needs and their
gate-keeping role to secondary care [18]. ‘Primary
care-led commissioning’ has been a central feature of
NHS policy in England since 1991 and its most recent
incarnation was the establishment in 2013 of 211 clinical
commissioning groups (CCGs), responsible for allocating
approximately two thirds of the total NHS budget in
England (£73.6 billion in 2017–18) [19]. Research con-
sistently shows that primary care-led-commissioning has
been more effective in driving change in general practice
and community-based health services than in acute hos-
pital services [20, 21].
The Health and Social Care Act 2012 re-emphasised
the role of competition and implicitly encouraged more
extensive use of for-profit and third sector providers
alongside mainstream NHS-managed services [22]. Yet
there has been a parallel emphasis on collaboration and
integration, to provide co-ordinated care for the growing
numbers of (mainly frail older) people living with mul-
tiple long-term conditions [23]. Commissioners have
therefore had to explore ways of balancing apparently
contradictory pressures: to promote provider competi-
tion through contracting and procurement, while simul-
taneously securing collaborative service delivery through
strategic purchasing.
Joint commissioning of health and social care
Similar provisions for adult social care accompanied the
introduction of an NHS purchaser-provider split in the
1990 Act. However, social care differed in that councils
had already been dealing with many external providers
in the for-profit and not-for-profit sectors. Indeed, the
majority of residential social care was already provided
through those sectors, funded predominantly through
social security payments [24].
As the interdependencies between the NHS and social care
markets began to be acknowledged, the concept of joint
commissioning emerged [25, 26]. This was to provide the
‘link between planning and activity’ [24] through formal spe-
cification of joint services, engagement of providers, and the
shaping of markets to provide a better balance of residential
and domiciliary services and reduce the risk of market fail-
ure. However, a recent study of joint commissioning over 20
years found there was ‘little evidence to link it to changes in
outcomes’ [25]. In this respect, the results of joint commis-
sioning mirrored the limited impact of integration of care
provision more generally [10, 27, 28].
There is a great deal of evidence about the wide range of
barriers that prevent integrated working being more success-
ful [28]. For example, Waring et al. [29] highlighted the
significance of barriers to integrated and inter-professional
working stemming from social and cultural differences in-
cluding those related to knowledge, organisation and power.
Weick [30] emphasises the associated role of ‘organisational
sense-making’, whereby organisations may use the same ter-
minology but have different interpretations of the issue. Fo-
cusing on the role of commissioning, Checkland et al. [31]
argue that local sense-making processes will impede
top-down solutions unless adequate attention is given to
local contexts. Elsewhere, they draw on Scott's [32] analysis
of institutions as resting on three pillars (regulatory, norma-
tive and cultural-cognitive) to argue that NHS institutions
have often focused on the regulatory pillar, without giving
sufficient attention to the moral and cultural assumptions
that drive behaviour. This has led to a gap between NHS in-
stitutions and the process and ambitions of commissioning
as a mechanism for delivering change [17].
In summary, NHS and joint commissioning have been
understood as a process of service redesign and change
that requires a balance between relational and transac-
tional activities. Meanwhile primary care-led commis-
sioning is considered a lever for change in primary care
and community health settings, but rarely in others, and
professional cultures within and across health and social
care constrain efforts to commission integrated care.
There has however been relatively little research into the
effectiveness or otherwise of commissioning as an ap-
proach to bringing about change to whole systems of
care, which can encompass multiple CCGs and local au-
thorities, as well as many health and care providers.
Whole systems integrated Care in North West London
NWL has a population of just over two million people
served by eight boroughs (Brent, Ealing, Hammersmith
and Fulham, Harrow, Hillingdon, Hounslow, Kensington
and Chelsea, and the City of Westminster) and their cor-
responding CCGs. In 2012, the CCGs and seven boroughs
(excluding Hillingdon) established a Whole Systems Inte-
grated Care Programme (WSIC), building on prior local
initiatives such as the inner and outer NWL integrated
care pilots (ICPs) [33] and Tri-Borough community bud-
gets programme [34]. At the same time, a major reconfig-
uration of acute hospital services (‘Shaping a Healthier
Future’) was planned, together with a further programme
to develop primary care as the centrepiece for extending
the role of out of hospital services [35].
Soon after WSIC was initiated, the Department of
Health announced a call for Integrated Care and Sup-
port Pioneers [36]. WSIC became the basis of a bid to
this call from 31 partners in NWL sharing a vision ‘to
improve the quality of care for individuals, carers and
families and to empower and support people to maintain
independence and to lead full lives as active participants
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in their communities’ [37]. This was underpinned by
three principles [37]
– People will be empowered to direct their care and
support, and to receive the care they need in their
homes or local community.
– GPs will be at the centre of organising and
coordinating care so that it is accessible and
provided in the most appropriate setting.
– Systems will enable and not hinder the provision of
integrated care, and ensure that funding flows to
where it is needed most.
The original timetable for WSIC specified an eight-month
period of ‘co-design to inform local implementation’. Pilot
sites, or ‘early adopters’, were to be identified during the last
3 months of this phase, after which they would ‘be ready to
commence in shadow form in early January 2014’ and start
‘working together under “whole system” commissioning and
provision arrangements to improve outcomes for the local
population’ by April 2015 [37]. The governance and imple-
mentation structures designed to deliver the WSIC
programme were complex and encompassed both the bor-
ough and pan-NWL levels [38] (see Fig. 2).
The latter centred on a programme management office
and executive staffed by a Strategy and Transformation
Team with support from external management consul-
tants and based in the office of the collaborative of the
eight CCGs. The CCGs developed a joint financial strat-
egy to support their collective WSIC work, pooling re-
sources allocated to all CCGs by NHS England for
‘transformation’ – £24.9 m was pooled from 2013/14 to
2015/16, of which £7.9 m was spent on management
consultancy during the first 2 years [38]. NWL therefore
represented a bold and ambitious programme of
intended change to local health and care services, with
significant reliance placed on the role of commissioning
to bring this about.
During the co-design phase, five working groups were
established at NWL level to help local areas implement inte-
grated care ‘at scale and pace’ focusing on: populations and
outcomes; GP networks; provider networks; commissioning
and finance; and informatics. The intention was that pre-
paratory work for whole systems integration would be ‘done
once’ across all participating boroughs and CCGs. A
cross-cutting ‘Embedding partnerships’ work stream was also
established comprising a lay partners’ forum of some 120
people and a lay partners’ advisory group whose members
Fig. 2 The governance arrangements for the North West London Whole Systems Integrated Care Programme [38]
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attended each of the five working groups. As well as advising
on programme design, lay partners were on all WSIC’s gov-
ernance bodies and no meeting was considered quorate un-
less a lay partner was present.
Methods
Study design
Our study was commissioned by Imperial College Health
Partners and the Collaboration of NWL CCGs to evalu-
ate the initial design and piloting phases of WSIC from
February 2014 to April 2015. The brief [39] stipulated a
primarily qualitative evaluation to provide an independ-
ent, summative assessment of:
– how the WSIC programme was designed;
– the involvement of local stakeholders in the design
process;
– the development and early implementation of early
adopter (EA) schemes; and
– the extent to which the WSIC programme appeared
to be on track towards its objectives.
A formative element was also required by the funders,
to provide ongoing feedback from the research in light
of evidence that the momentum of large-scale change
often falters and fails as it moves into its implementation
phase [39]. The formative component was also an ac-
knowledgement that an independent, academic voice
was needed in developing this large-scale, high-profile
and costly intervention [40].
The study comprised two phases designed to meet the
four research objectives, and to mirror the two phases of
development: co-design; and early implementation. The
methods employed within each phase are summarised in
Table 1. Ethical approval was granted by the research
ethics committee of the London School of Hygiene and
Tropical Medicine, where the national evaluation of the
wider Pioneer programme was located. (LSHTM ethics
ref.: 7215).
Data collection
Our data collection reflected the WSIC aim of integrating
commissioning and care delivery at macro, meso and mi-
cro levels [41]. We worked with: commissioners, providers
and other stakeholders who were involved as representa-
tives at the pan-NWL (macro) level; leaders and project
managers of individual EAs (meso level); and individual
providers of care at the user (micro) level. A mixed
methods approach was chosen to surface and assess the
complexity of WSIC and its wide range of stakeholders
[40]. Semi-structured interviews enabled us to explore
participants’ perceptions and experiences of the pro-
gramme’s development. Participants were selected purpos-
ively and we conducted 73 one-hour interviews,
predominantly face-to-face, with: managers and frontline
staff in acute services, CCGs, general practice, community
Table 1 Phases of the study and data collected
Phase Main research tasks Data collected
Phase 1 – February to June 2014
Describing, understanding and assessing the context and processes
of WSIC
(Objectives 1&2)
Assess co-design of the
programme
Research co-design workshop (re overall objectives
and approach)
30 × 1-h interviews
Involvement of
stakeholders in co-design
Observation field notes of 60 hrs of meetings or
workshops
Analysis of programme documentation including WSIC
toolkit
Review of UK and international literature on integrated
care and commissioning
Feedback workshop with WSIC stakeholders re initial
findings
Phase 2 – July 2014 to April 2015
Tracking progress of 9 EA schemes and in-depth case studies of 4
EAs, plus ongoing programme-level monitoring of context
(Objectives 3&4)
Development and early
implementation of EAs
Research co-design workshop with EA and WSIC stake-
holders (re case study approach and selection)
16 × 1 h interviews at pan-NWL level
27 × 1-h interviews in case study EAs
Field notes of 60 hrs of meeting observations both in
EA case studies and at pan-NWL level
Continued analysis of programme documentation
On-line survey of members of EA steering committees
On-line survey of all GP practices in NWL
Feedback workshop with EAs re survey and other data
initial findings
Progress made towards
WSIC objectives
Synthesis by research team of all data
Comparison of conclusions with WSIC plans
Feedback workshop with WSIC core leadership team
to share draft report themes and framework
Feedback workshop with WSIC stakeholders to share
final draft report
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and mental health services, and local authorities; lay part-
ners; and third sector providers (see interview topic guides
in additional files 1, 2 and 3). Participation was voluntary
and informed prior written consent was obtained. We also
observed approximately 120 h of meetings, including the
process of selecting EAs, regular WSIC governance meet-
ings, co-design workshops, and events held to refine WSIC
plans. We undertook documentary analysis of programme
materials and conducted a rapid review of UK and inter-
national literature on integrated care and commissioning. Fi-
nally, as part of the formative approach, the team conducted
co-design workshops with a cross-section of stakeholders
from the NWL health and care system.
Four EAs were selected as case studies [42] on the
basis of geography, contextual differences, target popula-
tion characteristics, partners delivering the intervention,
readiness for implementation, scale of the initiative, and
the extent of social care involvement [38]. To comple-
ment the case studies, we conducted two on-line sur-
veys. The first covered all steering committee members
for each of the nine EAs (November to December 2014).
It explored perceptions of progress, the value of the ini-
tial co-design process and outcomes, and the contribu-
tion of different stakeholder groups. A 60% response
rate was obtained. A second survey – of GP practices –
was conducted to explore GPs’ awareness of WSIC, as
well as their views of its plans and local requirements to
realise them. A covering letter with a hyperlink to the
survey was distributed by CCGs from March to May
2015 and secured a response rate of 39%.
Data analysis
All interviews were recorded, transcribed and then
coded using NVivo 11. Blind coding was undertaken by
the research team to check consistency. A framework
analysis approach [43] was applied to the coding, using
high-level themes to categorise the data. Themes were
first created deductively based on the findings of the lit-
erature review and subsequently refined inductively
based on a pilot coding and analysis of a randomly se-
lected subset of 15 interviews. The final themes used in
the framework analysis included: transactional and rela-
tional functions of health commissioning drawn from
Øvretveit’s cycle; professional and cultural aspects of
WSIC development as deduced from our review of lit-
erature on health and joint commissioning (including
the role of GPs and primary care, and involvement of
local government); key organisational components of in-
tegrated care (including finance, governance, model of
care); historical and contextual factors; and views about
the future of WSIC. A draft narrative account of EA am-
bitions and development was prepared for, and checked
with, each of the four case study sites. Data were ana-
lysed by the research team in four internal workshop
sessions, exploring findings in relation to the three
WSIC principles described above. Emerging conclusions
were tested with WSIC stakeholders in two additional
workshop sessions as part of our formative approach,
prior to completing the research report.
Limitations of the research methods
The scale of the WSIC programme presented challenges
to obtaining detailed understandings of activities across
the entire initiative. Despite conducting a large number
of interviews, we were unable to engage with front-line
staff to the extent we had anticipated, largely because of
delays in establishing integrated care services on the
ground. The team was aware that the formative compo-
nent of the study contained a number of risks including
those of identifying too closely with the success of WSIC
and being pressed for definitive findings before our evi-
dence had been fully analysed. Consequently, we were
careful to restate the summative as well as formative ob-
jectives of the research in feedback to WSIC and to
highlight the degree of confidence we placed on different
findings as they emerged.
Results
Strategic role of commissioning
The WSIC programme was ambitious in its vision and ob-
jectives, with five domains of intended outcomes ultim-
ately identified: quality of life; quality of care; financial
sustainability; professional experience; and operational
performance [44]. However, performance measures set by
NWL commissioners for WSIC emphasised national tar-
gets: reducing avoidable emergency admissions to hos-
pital; and reducing emergency department attendances –
by 10 to 15% and up to 30%, respectively [44]. The diffi-
culty WSIC commissioners experienced in setting mea-
sures that encapsulated their broader aspirations reflected
their more general struggle to articulate exactly what they
were trying to do and by when: ‘There’s just so much
change to implement all at once, that their target date of
having things go live on the first of April next year is, I
think, completely unrealistic’ (I1). This reflected concern
emerging from our data about the criteria used for deter-
mining how far programme intentions were being realised.
We concluded such concerns substantially reflected the
very high-level nature of WSIC aims and ambitions.
The programme described itself as ‘commissioner-led’, al-
though which set of commissioners was actually leading ap-
peared to be contested. For some, WSIC was deemed to be
led by GPs in their role as local commissioners: ‘The Whole
Systems is GP-led. But it’s led by GPs as CCGs … those GPs
that have a strategic view’ (I2). Others cited the overall
CCG organisations as being in the lead, given their statu-
tory NHS planning function: ‘we are, as commissioners, also
having to set out a strategy for the system’ (I3). Yet others
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saw ambiguity and conflicts of interest in CCGs, as
GP-membership organisations, undertaking the leadership
role: ‘your CCG colleagues are both building the new
commissioning approaches, but also have got one eye on
how they trade in the provider network and that is really
causing a lot of tensions’ (I4).
During our research, governance and strategy at the
NWL level were driven primarily by the Collaboration of
CCGs, its programme executive group and programme
team (see Fig. 2). There was less evidence of input from
local government and other partners. Although it was a
very co-designed programme it’s probably fair to say in
the early days right through to autumn last year [2014]
they would probably have said it was a clinical commis-
sioning group, commissioner-driven conversation, even
though they were full partners (I5).
In our survey of EA steering groups in late 2014
(Table 2), 87% of respondents reported that CCGs had
been ‘very’ or ‘extremely’ involved in designing their
local EA, and 83% for the WSIC programme team, 31%
for NHS front line staff and 58% for adult social care
commissioners (Table 3).
By the end of our study in April 2015, and despite
major investments of time and money in designing the
programme, WSIC was over a year behind schedule and
only two of nine EA schemes were even partially under
way [38]. WSIC’s bold and proactive vision appeared
elusive in implementation.
Relational and transactional elements of commissioning
The scale and complexity of the NWL system brought with
it high transaction costs. The programme executive alone
held 25 meetings between October 2013 and May 2015, an
indication of the time commitment expected in one element
of the commissioning cycle: planning. As one respondent
noted: “[it is] costing us a fortune in terms of man and
woman hours, a shocking amount of time it is getting to
nearly ridiculous proportions” (I6). At the same time, WSIC
leaders emphasised that they had sought to expedite matters
by adopting an approach that transcended usual commis-
sioning arrangements: ‘we completely disregarded the
commissioner–provider split in doing it [developing WSIC],
and that’s caused some angst from some of the local author-
ities and from some of the CCGs, saying, “You’re running
completely roughshod over all our commissioning responsibil-
ities”. And I’m glad we did because, if we hadn’t, we would
have massively constrained what people came up with’ (I7).
The co-design phase of WSIC was intended as a
mechanism for organisational development, to develop
integrated care ‘tools’ and to foster local ownership: ‘[it]
came about because we were clear that this was only go-
ing to work if it was a journey that everyone came on,
but we also had to strike the balance between doing some
of the design thinking once that local areas could then
hang their own initiatives off ’ (I8). However, this was ex-
perienced by some as burdensome: ‘we’ve almost been
too engaged in the sense that there’s been so many meet-
ings and so much activity that one is invited to which we
can’t always service’ (I9). For others, co-design work was
an expensive process (reflecting the cost of support
commissioned from external consultants) and its value
for money was questioned: ‘This entire programme, we
spent probably more than £2m on [name of company]
along with the toolkit … I question the balance, and
management consultancy – by definition they come and
go’ (I10).
The extent of stakeholder involvement in WSIC design
work was demonstrated by responses to our survey of EA
steering group members (see Tables 2 and 3). WSIC expli-
citly embraced an inclusive approach to build support for
new models of care, but it was heavily front-loaded into the
co-design process. We reported back to WSIC leaders the
risk of stakeholder involvement tailing off in spring 2015 as
implementation began and resources for supporting imple-
mentation were spread across nine EAs. The significant at-
tention paid to relational work within WSIC was
particularly evident within the Embedding Partnerships
work stream: 78% of steering committee respondents re-
ported lay partners had been ‘very’ or ‘extremely’ involved
in local project design (Table 3). The continuing commit-
ment and resource allocated to this work stood out com-
pared with other Pioneers [28].
Table 2 Results from early adopter survey: ‘How involved have local commissioners been in the design of your early adopter project
(from February 2014 to now)?’
Local authority adult social care Local authority public health CCG NHS England (London)
Extremely involved 14% 5% 57% 3%
Very involved 44% 25% 30% 12%
Moderately involved 24% 3% 9% 23%
Slightly involved 15% 39% 2% 32%
Not at all involved 4% 27% 1% 30%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
N 80 59 82 77
Source: Survey of WSIC EAs conducted from November–December 2014
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The early development of EAs continued to be largely
relational in nature – for example in designing local
models of integrated care – with much less emphasis on
transactional issues such as negotiating needs-based
budgets, rewriting contracts to procure new models of
care, designing and implementing new workforce roles,
or piloting multidisciplinary team working.
Transactional elements of implementation were not
wholly neglected, being addressed in the phase one,
co-design work streams and captured in a ‘toolkit’ for in-
tegration [44] which received significant input from ex-
ternal consultants. This toolkit included resources to
support: contracting and procurement, the calculation of
population-based budgets, and approaches to collecting
and using data for planning and delivering integrated
care. Consistent with the objective of ‘doing the design
work once’, 75% of steering group respondents thought
the toolkit had been ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ helpful when
designing their EA.
We concluded that WSIC was highly relational in its
approach, including in the way in which it sought to de-
sign and develop transactional elements of the
programme. It seemed as though the anatomy of inte-
grated care was constantly attended to, yet the physi-
ology – the actual life-blood and practical functioning of
the desired new approach to care – remained elusive or
perhaps just too difficult to enact.
Role of GPs and primary care in commissioning
Although ostensibly CCG and local authority-owned and
led, the WSIC programme was in reality designed and
managed from the programme’s NHS headquarters.
Even when primary care contributions were identified,
only a minority of GP leaders were seen to be fully en-
gaged. Whilst 72% of GP survey respondents had heard
of WSIC (n = 93), only 25% of them considered them-
selves to be ‘quite’ or ‘very’ involved in it (n = 23). Work-
load pressures were considered by GPs to be the main
impediment to WSIC progress, suggesting a lack of en-
gagement by the programme of frontline GPs or respon-
siveness to their local perspectives and concerns. Thus
the extent to which WSIC had become part of the physi-
ology of local health systems through the mechanisms of
primary care-led commissioning was limited. Respon-
dents within primary care argued for their perspective as
providers to be heeded within WSIC: ‘we’re a member-
ship organisation of general practices … so in part I have
a role to engage with and bring along all of general prac-
tice in the work we are doing’ (I3). This was acknowl-
edged by the central strategy and transformation team:
‘it has to be owned by them [local areas], otherwise it
will not work, really; it will just fall over as they get into
the next phase’ (I2). This view also seemed prescient in
anticipating the struggle that WSIC would have in mov-
ing from pan-NWL planning and design to the local im-
plementation of integrated care.
The central role of the GP in coordinating care for
people was one of WSIC’s three core aims, a feature
some criticised as an overly medical focus for a ‘whole
systems’ initiative: ‘The programme is being led by CCGs,
albeit with support and sponsorship from local author-
ities. To the outside world, it can appear health-led
which can cause issues’ (I3) One work stream focused on
developing networks of GP providers consistent with na-
tional objectives of ‘scaling up’ general practice and
community services to support the shift of services from
hospital settings [45, 46]. Even here however, it seemed
that the drive came more from the collaboration of
CCGs and central WSIC team, than from general prac-
tice itself: ‘We’re still in exactly the same phase that we
would be, which is the commissioners write the spec, they
decide they’re going to procure, and then we all bid for
that, like any other system [ ….] Similarly, the commis-
sioners are designing when and how the providers should
be engaged – that is not being provider-led’ (I11).
Despite extensive lay partner and other stakeholder
engagement in its design and development phase, our
overriding perception of WSIC was of a large NHS stra-
tegic management project, not a primary care-led ap-
proach with significant health and social care provider
engagement. In practice, much of the impetus,
decision-making, and priority-setting came from the
Table 3 Results from early adopter survey: ‘How involved have these other groups been in the design of your early adopter project
(from February 2014 to now)?’
Patients, service users, carers Lay partners Voluntary sector representatives NHS front line staff WSIC programme team
Extremely involved 35% 39% 25% 9% 51%
Very involved 31% 39% 48% 22% 32%
Moderately involved 26% 14% 20% 48% 16%
Slightly involved 7% 8% 7% 20% 1%
Not at all involved 1% 1% 0% 1% 0%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
N 81 80 81 81 81
Source: Survey of WSIC EAs conducted November–December 2014
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senior management of the collaboration of CCGs more
than the wider body of the local health and care system.
Commissioning and culture in health and social care
WSIC encountered a series of cultural clashes. First,
there was the conceptualisation of WSIC as a ‘strategic
management project’, lent weight by leadership from
WSIC ‘headquarters’, significant investment in external
management consultancy support, and the consequent
use of a highly programmatic approach to project plan-
ning, management and reporting. The associated use of
temporary project managers at the level of the individual
EAs was considered by some to be problematic, albeit
we observed that their skills were important to keep the
programme development moving: ‘It’s crazy, yes, because
they’re temporary, and then when they go away there’s
nobody there that has the institutional knowledge or the
ability to carry it beyond … you have dedicated people,
but you just don’t have enough resources and leadership
and the ambitions are too high for what they want to
achieve by when’ (I12). The senior managers leading
WSIC were influential and respected but both of the two
principal management architects had moved on before
our study concluded.
This ‘project-ness’ [47] was frequently noted by our re-
spondents as being an uncomfortable feature and even
alien to the culture of health and social care profes-
sionals in NWL, particularly in relation to the use of
management consultants. We were told, for example,
that: ‘[Name of company], having got the brief, are very
clear about what they think is the answer particularly
around ACPs [accountable care partnerships] and capi-
tated budgets, whereas others increasingly have doubts
about that’ (I13) although there was acknowledgement
of the rigour and attention to process that this involve-
ment brought: ‘I feel part of something quite strong and I
think that’s the level of capacity that’s invested. I always
wonder how it’s invested and where the money comes
from but I think the people generally who lead it, I think
are for the most part very strong and independent arbi-
ters really, which I think is a very strong role that they
play’ (I14).
The cultural dissonance between primary care-led
commissioning, and the extensive use of programme
management and external consultants, was summed up
by a hospital clinician: ‘I think it should be clinician
driven, clinician led, clinician and patient driven. Why
do we need to pay an expensive external agency to do
what is basically motherhood and apple pie?’ (I15).
Second, there were cultural differences between the
NHS and local government. As explored elsewhere [38],
WSIC was presented as a joint undertaking across the
whole NHS and local government system with a focus
on wellbeing, prevention and independent living. In
reality however, it focussed on projects intended to ad-
dress short to medium term NHS concerns, namely
avoiding admissions to hospital or reducing time spent
in hospital. This was described as ‘they’re [social care
managers] in the room but they’re not at the table’ (I16)
and ‘I was astounded at … the lack of capacity in local
authority feeding into the whole systems, at the low level
of relationship building, common purpose, vision and
strategy, rather than focusing on the technical aspects of
WSIC, which the external consultants are driving’ (I4).
We concluded that explanations included: pressures on
local government finances that prevented senior man-
agers attending the multiple workshops and meetings in-
tegral to the WSIC approach; its strong NHS
management focus; and the failure to engage local polit-
ical leaders.
Third, WSIC’s commissioner-led approach meant that
local providers of health and social care felt that they
were not always sufficiently involved in the programme’s
planning work: ‘One of our problems in [borough] has
very much been that this is not being led by the providers
and the providers have been passive recipients … it’s us
as commissioners really pushing them’ (I17). This may
reflect providers’ belief that change was unlikely to hap-
pen, or that they were waiting for evidence of serious
commissioner intent to invest in change. ‘Designing the
care planning processes has not particularly involved
providers, not to the extent that they feel ownership of it
[ …] I think they’ve set themselves up for something that
they’re not able to deliver’ (I18). Thus WSIC’s overly re-
lational approach to commissioning led to provider en-
gagement that was significant in one sense (senior
managers and clinicians were often at key meetings) but
was not rooted back into the operation of individual
health and social care organisations, and hence unlikely
to lead to practical changes to services at local level.
Discussion
Commissioning integrated care in north West London
The WSIC programme was led by commissioners with
NWL-wide responsibilities, who were heavily dependent
on CCGs and local authorities to use strategic purchas-
ing capabilities to achieve better integrated care. Yet, by
May 2015, the programme was falling significantly be-
hind its own delivery timeline. Despite WSIC’s bold vi-
sion, respondents to our evaluation struggled to describe
precisely what changes to day-to-day provision of ser-
vices were intended and when they would be achieved.
NWL commissioners relied heavily on relational as-
pects of commissioning as the main route for change.
Even where attention was given to transactional work
(e.g. exploring how to set population budgets, design
contracts, determine information governance), this was
approached through highly relational means (such as
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co-design workshops), which stakeholders struggled to
translate into operational practice. WSIC leaders as-
sumed that engaging stakeholders in NWL-wide
co-design work streams would result in the latter be-
coming ambassadors for change in local EAs, but this
expectation was neither explicitly articulated nor
supported.
WSIC leaders likewise seemingly assumed that senior
GP commissioner involvement in WSIC governance and
planning would permeate the wider general practice com-
munity, but our survey of all GP practices in NWL sug-
gested otherwise. WSIC sought to establish GP provider
networks across all eight CCG areas, but this flew in the
face of evidence on the need for such organisations to be
professionally developed from the bottom up [18, 48].
The extensive use of external consultants was a key fac-
tor in some of the cultural clashes identified above and
the scepticism among some NHS and social care profes-
sionals about the value of this investment. A further limit-
ing, cultural factor was WSIC’s NHS-constructed view of
care integration and failure to embrace a more fully whole
systems approach. In our fieldwork, we found little refer-
ence to joint commissioning within the WSIC framework,
although there were examples of ongoing initiatives at the
borough level. Whilst it might be argued that WSIC was
an NWL-wide exercise in joint commissioning, local au-
thority involvement was most limited at that level. Local
authorities lacked capacity to engage fully with WSIC, and
did not consistently identify themselves as ‘North West
London’ (having eight independent boroughs and two
local government alliances of councils in the area) in the
same way as the NHS, which was working to its prior re-
gional footprint.
The NHS leadership within WSIC set unrealistic ob-
jectives and timescales for major change – seemingly be-
guiled by the latest policy fashion [49] – and failed to
join up the interdependent strategies of WSIC and
‘Shaping a Healthier Future’ [35] into publicly narrated
and detailed programmes of complementary change.
Equally, it remained to be seen whether borough-level
joint commissioning would kick in as the focus of WSIC
moved to rolling out EAs across local areas. The evi-
dence from both the initial (NWL) stage of work and
the literature on joint commissioning suggested this
would be a significant challenge.
The weaknesses of health commissioning identified in
our review of the literature were found to be present in
NWL’s enacting of its WSIC programme, and contrib-
uted collectively to the significant delay in implementing
the vision for integrated care locally. WSIC was also an
attempt to achieve large-scale organisational change.
Best et al. [4] suggested a set of ‘simple rules’ for under-
taking large-scale change i) engage individuals at all
levels in leading the change efforts; ii) establish feedback
loops; iii) attend to history; iv) engage physicians; and v)
involve patients and families.
Applying these rules in NWL, it can be asserted that:
– significant effort went into engaging some people at
some levels in plans for change;
– the project planning approach was extensive and
included apparently rigorous ‘checkpoints’ and
monitoring;
– WSIC built on prior integrated care and community
budgeting initiatives locally, as well as participating
in national pilot schemes;
– the WSIC programme was located within a policy of
primary care-led commissioning committed to
strong general practice involvement; and
– there was a major commitment to recruiting,
training and working with lay partners.
Less evident however were:
– successful engagement of front-line health and social
care staff, their managers and union representatives
in detailed planning for new ways of providing and
staffing services;
– involvement of local politicians in WSIC planning
and governance;
– setting graduated and realistic outcome measures;
– learning sufficiently from prior local experience of
pilots that had demonstrated the time required to
change service delivery patterns across multiple
professions and the limited prospects of affecting
emergency admission rates;
– engaging the majority of clinicians employed in
community and hospital settings in the
implementation of EAs; and
– involving the public, patients and carers in actual
implementation of service change, as opposed to
having intensive but narrow engagement in
programme planning and governance.
At the same time, however, some of our findings could
not be accommodated within Best et al.’s five rules [4].
This was not unexpected. The authors, themselves were
explicit about the limitations of their paper as, first, a
small-scale rapid review commissioned by Saskatchewan
policymakers; while also emphasising that a ‘second, and
perhaps more important, limitation of this study was not
with the methodology but with what was not in the lit-
erature or identified by our consultation group. The five
simple rules described here may be necessary for
large-system transformation but are probably not suffi-
cient’ (p445). We would concur with this conclusion.
While we have a more limited focus here which, to-
gether with space limitations, does not allow for a
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comprehensive re-assessment of the ‘five rules’, it is
nonetheless clear that some critical dimensions of the
NWL experience are not captured by them or the litera-
ture review from which they were derived. For example,
the rules give very little recognition to the importance of
cultural, behavioural and cognitive factors which can
both facilitate and impede commissioning processes and
the implementation of large-scale change in health and
related services [30–32].
The potential and limitations of commissioning in
delivering large-scale change and integration
In a publicly funded health system, it is vital that there is a
body that sets priorities, plans how best to use its re-
sources to meet identified needs, puts these intentions
into action, and accounts publicly for its performance
[16]. The English NHS continues to use new public man-
agement’s purchasing and contracting functions for this
purpose, working within Øvretveit’s commissioning cycle.
Our study highlights the consequences of giving insuffi-
cient attention to implementation in that cycle and espe-
cially the need for commissioners to enable, support and
performance manage the delivery of procured services,
while working closely with providers at all times.
The critical first stage of implementation is to reach
consensus across commissioners, providers and service
users about ‘what is it we intend to do’ so that the exact
nature of the service change can be more precisely artic-
ulated, planned and enacted for staff, users and carers.
Commissioning aims in WSIC were too often poorly
specified, and then subject to overly optimistic and blunt
measures of progress – such as avoided emergency ad-
mission to hospital, or roll out of EAs in 6 months. As a
result, such aims are inevitably doomed not to be
achieved [50]. The work of commissioners in convening
the different actors (e.g. funders, regulators, providers, ser-
vice users) to review, plan and (re) design approaches to
care forms part of the service design stage of the commis-
sioning cycle, and needs to link closely with subsequent
implementation work as part of the process of ‘making it
happen’. This focus on providers and commissioners
working together to clarify commissioning goals and out-
comes, including their implications for provider roles and
behaviours, and the implementation of new services, re-
quires acceptance that the ‘purchaser-provider split’ is nei-
ther neat nor clear, but an intellectual distinction across
which significant discussion, collaboration and joint work
are required as plans are developed and implemented.
Conclusion
We concluded that the highly relational co-design phase
in NWL could take the commissioning process only so
far, and that commissioners have an equally important
role in piloting and implementing new services to ensure
the presence of the necessary support, resources and
management expertise. Explicitly identifying implemen-
tation processes and responsibilities within the commis-
sioning cycle emphasises the vital need to engage service
providers from the outset (including front-line staff most
affected by service changes). As our research was con-
cluding in April 2015, the WSIC programme was setting
up a ‘change academy’ to support implementation of the
EAs, a highly appropriate approach, but perhaps some-
what late in the overall change process.
Richard Bohmer [51] has reviewed international ex-
perience of attempts to transform health services and he
echoes our findings in NWL, highlighting the limitations
of commissioning in market-based approaches: ‘experi-
ence shows that although a changed market may be a
helpful precondition to local performance improvement,
it hardly guarantees effective operational change.’ Boh-
mer asserts the importance of sustained attention to
multiple marginal changes required for the implementa-
tion of ‘transformed’ services, over a long period of time,
guided, resourced and supported by senior leaders who
can also ensure the commitment of middle managers
and multidisciplinary teams. His argument reinforces the
similar conclusions of Dixon-Woods et al. [47] and this
need to secure large-scale change through incremental
steps was also highlighted in international consultancy
advice to NWL as our study ended.
We propose therefore a revised cycle of commission-
ing (see Fig. 3) that retains its focus on assessing needs,
planning, engaging in service (re) design, procuring (and
decommissioning) services. It also builds on work by
Oxford Brookes University [52] that incorporated Dem-
ing’s [53] plan-do-review-act approach into the cycle of
commissioning and includes change and budget man-
agement functions. Similarly, our approach reflects Mur-
ray’s [54] suggestion that a ‘purchasing cycle’ should
operate within the commissioning cycle, to provide a
more explicit focus on the ‘delivery’ function. Our pro-
posed commissioning cycle emphasises the responsibility
of commissioners to:
– define specifically what changes to services are
intended;
– convene stakeholders to plan for and support
implementation continuously; and
– see outcomes as something for which
commissioners and providers are jointly
accountable.
This model shares much with the ‘accountable care’
approach currently promoted as the solution to the
vexed business of NHS commissioning [19, 55] and
for the purchasing of publicly funded health care in
the US [56].
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Securing significant local change to health and social care
services (either separately or together) will always be difficult,
and require sustained and detailed attention on many fronts.
Competent commissioning may help ensure appropriate
monitoring and review of current services, the design and
planning of necessary changes, and setting of priorities for
funding. It has its limits however, and these need to be ac-
knowledged, especially in change at the ‘scale and pace’ so
often exhorted by national leaders. In addition, healthcare
commissioning must shift the balance of its attention from
the relational towards the transactional, and work constantly
with service providers as well as users to specify, agree, sup-
port, coordinate and see through the implementation of
change. Without this, researchers will continue to produce
critical verdicts on the progress of large-scale and costly at-
tempts to develop better integrated care. Knapp and Wistow
[57] conceptualised commissioning as providing the missing
link between planning and activity. Both our study and the
literature emphasise that the need to support implementa-
tion is critical and continues to be insufficiently recognised
or developed. This need remains the weakest link in
commissioning and thus in health systems’ ability to secure
transformative change in local health and care services.
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